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ABSTRACT
Conventional economic theory assumes that firms always minimize costs given the output they produce.
News articles and interviews with executives, however, indicate that firms from time to time engage in cost-
cutting exercises.  One popular belief is that firms cut costs when they are in economic distress, and grow
fat when they are relatively wealthy.  We explore this hypothesis by studying the response of the stock
market values of gold mining companies to changes in gold prices.  The value of a cost-minimizing, profit-
maximizing firm is convex in the price of a competitively supplied input or output, but we find that the stock
values of many gold mining companies are concave in the price of gold.  We show that this is consistent
with fat accumulation when a firm grows wealthy.  We then address a number of potential alternative
explanations and discuss where fat in these companies might reside.
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Organizations do not generally minimize costs or maximize value. There is sheer
ine±ciency or rent dissipation. These stark and | to economists, although probably only
to economists | mildly shocking hypotheses suggest a variety of economic research topics.
In this paper we take a simple empirical look at one possible measure of the importance
of such \fat," by testing a rather general theoretical property of value maximization. The
empirical results suggest that many gold mining companies grow fat when they get rich,
and that the amounts concerned may be quite large.
In section II, we present an approach to diagnosing wealth-related rent dissipation.
Our approach is to estimate the second derivative of the value of the ¯rm as a function of
(exogenous) prices: simple maximizing theory would imply that this value function should
be convex, while we show that if wealth creates fat, the value function may tend to be
more concave.
We apply this approach to the gold mining industry in section III, estimating the
relationship between the price of gold and the stock market valuation of 17 gold mining
¯rms. We ¯nd that in many of the ¯rms the relationship is signi¯cantly concave, as the
\fat" theory might suggest, and contrary to the simple maximizing theory.
Section IV discusses a number of possible alternative explanations for the signi¯cant
concavity that we ¯nd in the valuation function of nearly half the ¯rms in our sample.
Section V asks where the fat may plausibly be coming from. We conclude in section VI.
II. The Response of Firm Value to Price Shocks
A. The Value Response of a Fat-Free Firm
Quite generally, the maximized value of any ¯rm is a (non-strictly) convex function
of any exogenously-determined price it faces (holding other prices constant).1 This funda-
mental (and well known) result holds whether the price is that of an input, an output, or
1 More generally, holding constant the other constraints and terms of trade facing the ﬂrm.
1a good that is sometimes an input and sometimes an output. The result does not depend
on any assumptions about production technology, slopes or elasticities of demand curves,
etc. All it requires is that the price in question be exogenous to the ¯rm.
To recall why this is so, note that for any ¯xed production plan, the ¯rm's value
is linear in each price. (Throughout this paper, we use the term \linear" to denote a
relationship of constant slope; we do not imply that the relationship passes through the
origin.) For example, if a gold mining company ignored any changes in the price of gold and
just mined a given quantity, say x ounces, the value of this company would be v(pg;x)´
p gx¡C(x), which changes linearly with the price of gold, pg.T h u s ,i fp gwere to change
from $300 to $400 per ounce, this would increase the value of the ¯rm, v(pg;x) by $100x,
which is exactly as much as the ¯rm's value would change if pg went from $400 to $500
per ounce.
A similarly linear relationship would hold if, for instance, it were the price of an input
such as labor, rather than the price of the ¯rm's output, that was changing while the
¯rm kept the same production plan. Instead of the slope being +x,i tw o u l dn o wb e¡ L ,
where L is labor input under that production plan; but, just as before, the slope would
not change with the price.
Thus, given a production plan x,t h ev a l u ev ( p g ;x) of the ¯rm would be linear in
the price of gold pg, but the ¯rm can switch among production plans so as to maximize
its value. Gold mining ¯rms expand output when the price of gold increases and reduce
output, e.g., by closing mines, when gold prices fall. Since the ¯rm can pro¯tably change
production plans when the price changes, the ¯rm's value, as a function of that price, is
an upper envelope of straight lines, V (pg) ´ maxx v(pg;x), and hence is convex. This is
illustrated in ¯gure 1.
As the argument suggests, the degree of convexity is closely related to the extent to
which the ¯rm pro¯tably adjusts quantities in response to price changes. Since (by the
envelope theorem) V 0(p)=x ( p ), it follows that V 00(p)=x 0( p ), and so a natural measure of
the curvature of the V function, pV 00(p)=V 0(p), the elasticity of the slope of V with respect
2to price, is equal to the elasticity of the ¯rm's supply with respect to price, px0(p)=x(p).
While this argument for convexity of the ¯rm's value function is straightforward and
intuitive when only one price is changing at a time, other prices that the ¯rm faces (of
either inputs or outputs) may also vary. For example, when we observe changes in the
spot price of gold, (expected) future prices of gold are presumably also changing. Thus we
need to consider simultaneous changes in multiple prices.
The basic theoretical result goes through in a natural generalization, whose proof is
the same as the argument above except that maximized value V is now an upper envelope
of hyperplanes rather than of straight lines. Without any claim of originality, we state:
Proposition 1. Consider a ¯rm that maximizes value V taking as given (input and/or
output) prices p ´ (p1;:::;p N). The maximized value V (p) is a convex function of the
vector p.
If we observed the entire vector p of relevant prices, this proposition would let us test
directly for value-maximization. Also, those prices that do not change can of course be
dropped from the price vector without a®ecting the prediction. However, there may well
be omitted prices that in fact vary in the sample. Indeed, what we do empirically below is
track the empirical relationship between one price | \the" price, pg, of gold, the primary
output | and the stock market's assessed value of the ¯rm. How is the logic of this
relationship a®ected if other, excluded, prices change in a way that is correlated (in the
sample) with pg? We address two versions of this question. First, we ask about prices that
the ¯rm and investors can observe, but that we do not include in our regressions. Second,
we ask about prices that are unknown at the observation date.
First, suppose that certain excluded prices are perfectly linearly related to pg in the
sample. Then the price vectors in the sample lie on a straight line in price space, and the
observed function ^ V (pg) is the slice of the convex value function that lies above that straight
line. Consequently, it is convex as one moves along that straight line, and empirically will
appear convex as an apparent or reduced-form function of pg alone.
3In particular, of course, a gold-producing ¯rm's maximized value will depend on the
future prices of gold. By the argument just given, if future gold prices were determin-
istically and linearly related to our single (quasi-spot) gold price measure, pg,c o n v e x i t y
would still hold. Similarly, if the price of a scarce input (such as, perhaps, skilled labor)
changed linearly with the price of gold, the theoretical prediction of observed convexity
would go through, even if we failed to include wage rates in our regressions.
Two potential problems emerge from these reassuring comments. First, if an excluded
price that is observed by the ¯rm and investors at the date of observation is non-linearly
related to the observed (by the econometrician) price, pg, the reduced form may not be
convex. And, second, we need to analyze the consequences for convexity of the fact that
future prices are uncertain conditional on the observed (quasi-spot) price.
Non-linear deterministic relationship: To illustrate the issues here, suppose for simplicity
that we are dealing only with two prices, N = 2, and examine the observed relationship
between p1 and V when (1) V is indeed a convex function of the full price vector (p1;p 2),
and (2) p2 = f(p1), where f is nonlinear (but note that any causality between p1 and p2
is not important here). Then we can denote the reduced-form or observed relationship
between V and p1 by ^ V (p1) ´ V (p1;f(p 1)).
To study the convexity of ^ V ,w ec a l c u l a t e :
^ V00(p)=V 11 +2 f0( p ) V 12 + f00(p)V2 +[ f0( p )]2V22: [1]
Thus the observed relationship ^ V will be convex unless
f00(p)V2 < ¡
£
V11 +2 f0( p ) V 12 +( f0( p ))2V22
¤
; [2]
where the expression in square brackets is positive by convexity of V in the vector (p1;p 2).
Thus ^ V will still be convex unless f(¢) is \su±ciently" nonlinear, p2 is \su±ciently" im-
portant in V , and either f is convex and good 2 is an input or else f is concave and good
2 is an output.
Uncertainty: If some prices are uncertain and their distribution is una®ected by changes in




V( p 1;p 2)dF(p2); [3]
a n dt h i si sas u mo fc o n v e xf u n c t i o n so fp 1provided that the distribution function F does
not shift with changes in the observed price p1. This argument holds regardless of how
much or little the ¯rm will be able to re-optimize as further information about currently
unobserved prices arrives: that a®ects the shape of V as a function of p2,b u tt h a ti s
irrelevant for this argument.
More di±cult questions arise if the distribution of unobserved prices varies with the
observed price, as is of course likely (especially when the unobserved prices are future
spot prices of gold). When the expected value of each future price moves linearly in the
observed spot price, so that for instance E(pt+1jpt)=a+bpt, there is a natural intuition
that convexity will carry over. Broadly speaking, V is convex in future prices as well as in
today's price, and if expected future prices are linear in today's price, one might expect ^ V
to be convex in today's price. This argument would of course be just a special case of the
analysis in equation [2] if the relationship among prices were deterministic. It also goes
through (by the previous paragraph) if the ¯rm were unable to respond to later news about
future prices. The argument does not completely work, however, if the ¯rm will be able
to respond to future prices: in that case, the option value resulting from the variability in
those prices may vary with today's price.
As an example, imagine that extreme values of p1 (high or low) correspond to low
conditional variances of future prices, so the conditional variance is an inverted U-shape as
af u n c t i o no fp . If the option value is an important part of expected pro¯ts in the second
period, extreme values of p1 would then correspond to low expected second-period pro¯ts,
and potentially to low present values.
To investigate this problem, consider the following illustrative two-period model. At
the beginning of period 1, the ¯rm is endowed with a stock S of ore. It learns the ¯rst-
period price, p1, and then it chooses ¯rst-period extraction (and sales), x1.I t sc o s t si nt h e
¯rst period of extracting x1 are x2
1=(2S), so its marginal cost is increasing linearly in x1 and
5decreasing in total stock or reserves. It knows (in choosing x1) the conditional distribution
of the second-period price p2, and it knows that at the beginning of period 2, it will learn
the value of p2 and will then choose second-period output x2,a tc o s tx 2
2= (2[S ¡ x1]).
Given x1 and p2, the second-period choice of x2 maximizes p2x2 ¡ x2
2=(2[S ¡ x1]),
whence we derive that second-period pro¯ts are equal to (S ¡ x1)p2
2=2. Consequently,
given p1, the ¯rst-period choice of x1 maximizes






The reduced-form value function ^ V (p1) is of course simply maxx1 ~ V (p1;x 1). By the
envelope theorem, ^ V 0(p1)=@~ V= @p 1, so di®erentiating again,













From the implicit-function theorem, x0
1(p1)h a st h es a m es i g na st h em i x e dp a r t i a l
derivative of ~ V .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,^ Vis convex unless E[p2
2jp1] is su±ciently concave in p1.I ti s
worth noting that this would be surprising in the following sense: E[p2
2jp1]=( E [ p 2j p 1])2 +
var[p2jp1], and the ¯rst term is convex in p1 under the assumption that price follows a
martingale. Thus considerable concavity of the conditional variance would be required to
overturn convexity of the observed value function.
Casual observation might suggest that we would expect the opposite: that is, that
extremely high values of p1 probably correspond to high, rather than low, conditional
variances (gold prices are high in times of uncertainty). We discuss this further in section
IV below.
B. Value Response and Fat Accumulation
We saw that value functions should be convex in price if ¯rms maximize value. Now
we consider an alternative hypothesis. If ¯rms systematically tend to accumulate fat
when they become wealthy, then the convex relationship could be reversed: the higher is
the (maximized) value V , the more fat accumulates, and the net V ¡ F function could
6potentially be concave. In general terms the idea that there may be fat that grows as
¯nancial constraints are loosened has been much discussed, for instance by Jensen (1986)
and other work on agency and free cash °ow, and earlier by Leibenstein (1966). We
argue that a particular pattern of fat accumulation might explain the empirical ¯ndings
we describe below.
In the gold mining industry, we hypothesize that high gold prices could induce fat, or
rent-dissipating behavior. As we will show, if fat is a su±ciently convex function of wealth,
this can reverse the value convexity result, and lead to a concave relationship between the
price of gold and the net-of-fat value of the ¯rm. Consequently, empirically examining
the curvature of the function relating stock-market value to gold prices may give us some
information on the existence and nature of rent dissipation in the industry.
Consider a gold mining company that has value V if it is operated with no fat, where
V is the present value of the stream of future pro¯ts in the fat-free company. The actual
stock market value of the ¯rm, S,w i l lb eS=V( p g)¡F( V( p g)), where F(V ) is the present
value of fat, i.e., the present value of pro¯ts dissipated through ine±ciency, which we take
to be a function of V .
Taking the derivative of stock market value with respect to pg,w eh a v et h e nt h a t
S
0( p g)=V
0( p g)[1 ¡ F
0(V (pg))]; [6]
which will have the same sign (presumably positive for gold-mining companies) with or
without the presence of fat so long as fat does not consume more than 100% of marginal
wealth changes to the ¯rm. Di®erentiating [6] with respect to pg to get the second derivative
of the impact of pg on stock valuation gives









1 ¡ F0(V (pg))
V 0(pg): [8]
7In a simple gold mining company (one with no other investments whose value is
a®ected by pg), the ¯rst term on the right in [8] is non-negative; it is the ratio of marginally
economic reserves (those barely worth extracting at price pg) to total economic reserves
(all those worth extracting at price pg). The second term is a measure of the curvature
of the fat function, and is positive if the fat function is convex. Since the second term is
subtracted, if the ¯rm has little opportunity to reoptimize when pg changes | so that the
¯rst term is small | and if the fat function is su±ciently convex,
S00(pg)
S0(pg) will be negative,
implying that S is concave in price.
Therefore, if empirically S is concave in pg, this may provide evidence of fat, or at least
investors' expectations of rent dissipation. It may also enable us to estimate the amount
of fat that investors anticipate. The technique is illustrated in ¯gure 2. Since
F(V (pg)) ´ V (pg) ¡ S(pg); [9]
we can di®erentiate and divide by V 0(pg)t og e t
F




Now suppose we have observations at two prices: a low price, pL
g , and a higher price pH
g .
Since theory tells us that V 0(pH
g ) ¸ V 0(pL
g ), and since we presume that fat increases in
wealth and hence in price (i.e., F0 and V 0 are positive), we have V 0(pH
g ) ¸ V 0(pL















This gives us an observable lower bound on the fraction of the marginal dollar of wealth
gain from an increase in pg near pH
g that is dissipated as fat, i.e., the quantity F0(V (pH
g )),
or \marginal fat." It is one minus the slope on the S function at point B divided by the
slope at point A. The bound is strictly positive when S is concave so that S0(pH
g ) <S 0( p L
g).
We also can get an observable lower bound on the total rent dissipation. We have,
from convexity of V ,
V (pH
g ) ¸ V (pL
g )+( p H
g ¡p L
g) V0( p L
g) : [12]
8Since fat is non-negative (so V ¸ S) and, we assume, weakly increasing in wealth (so
V 0 ¸ S0), the right-hand side is at least equal to
S(pL
g )+( p H
g ¡p L




g )) ´ V (pH
g ) ¡ S(pH




g ) ¡ S(pL
g)]; [14]
a n dt h i sl o w e rb o u n do nt o t a lf a ta tp H
g is positive when S is concave.
Equations [11] and [14] form the basis for interpreting our empirical results in terms
of marginal and total fat. These will underestimate the total and marginal fat if (as one
would expect) V (¢)i sstrictly convex or if the ¯rm has some fat even at pL
g (F(pL
g ) > 0a n d
F 0( p L
g)>0). This approach could lead to overestimates if other factors cause (part of) the
concavity of the S(¢) function. We discuss these alternative interpretations in section IV.
III. Gold Prices and the Valuation of Gold Mining Companies
The gold mining industry is a particularly attractive focus for studying the e®ects of
wealth changes on corporate fat, or rent dissipation, because there are frequent shocks to
the price of gold that are exogenous to the gold mining companies we study, and those
shocks translate directly into wealth shocks for gold mining ¯rms.
Gold mining companies view themselves as price takers in the gold market. The mar-
ket for gold is worldwide, due to the metal's high value-to-weight ratio and homogeneity,
and no producer controls more a few percent of the annual extraction of new gold. In
addition, demand for gold for industrial/jewelry use can be ful¯lled from existing stock.
Annual production of gold from mines worldwide is less than 2% of existing stock of the
metal. Gold mining companies make strategic decisions in response to changes in the price
of gold | most importantly output changes, including prospecting for gold, and open-
ing/closing mines | but individually no one company can exercise signi¯cant in°uence
over the price. Thus, unilateral market power appears to be absent. Coordinated oligopoly
interactions seem extremely unlikely given the large number of diverse gold mining ¯rms
9and other holders of gold stocks, and we are aware of no evidence or even allegations of
such behavior.
For the analysis outlined in the previous section to be applied directly, changes in the
price of the important input or output should be exogenous to the ¯rms observed. This
means not only that no ¯rm has market power, but also that price movements are not
driven by aggregate shocks to the observed ¯rms. If, for instance, gold price movements
were frequently the result of new gold discoveries or revisions in the estimated reserves
of the observed companies, the analysis would be much more complicated.2 But in fact
gold price changes are almost uniformly the result of demand-side news: world events
that change the attractiveness of gold as a store of wealth, trends in the demand for gold
jewelry, or policy decisions of central banks to hold more or less gold.3 We searched the
Wall Street Journal over the entire 21{year span of our sample for articles about gold
prices and found almost no mention of gold supply (from gold mines) as a cause of gold
price changes. Discussions with investor relations personnel at a number of gold mining
c o m p a n i e sa l s of a i l e dt ou n c o v e rc a s e si nw h i c hs u p p l ys h o c k sf r o mm i n e sw e r et h o u g h tt o
have signi¯cantly a®ected prices. The one case in which a supply shock from a mine was
thought to have possibly moved gold prices was the Bre{X incident in May 1997, in which
an area of Indonesia that had been touted as the largest gold ¯nd in history turned out to
have no economic supplies | but even that case had no signi¯cant e®ect on the price of
gold.4
2 In an earlier exploration of this topic, Borenstein and Farrell, 1996, we analyzed the value response
of oil companies to changes in the price of oil. We now analyze gold instead because it avoids a
serious problem in doing the exercise in oil. Even if one assumed that there was no market power |
a less compelling assumption than in gold | and ignored the complexity resulting from the fact that
these companies were also in the oil reﬂning business, an alternative explanation for a concave value
function remained. The shocks we observed to oil prices were mostly (expected) supply shocks, and
in many cases shocks to the supply of some ﬂrm in our sample. In that case, the price movements
would be movements along a demand curve. If total revenue were concave in price along that demand
curve, as seems quite possible, then the aggregate value of ﬂrms in the sample would very likely be
concave in the price of oil. This points out the importance of analyzing shocks that are exogenous
to the ﬂrms that we are studying.
3 One could of course regard these central banks’ decisions as supply shocks, but they are not shocks
to the supply of the ﬂrms we study.
4 On May 6, the day that the stock of Bre{X fell 97% in value (conﬂrming that the news of no economic
10While the value of a gold mining ¯rm should depend on spot and all information
about future prices of gold, we believe it is sensible to analyze the relationship empirically
using one (near-term futures) price. While we subject this assumption to robustness tests
below, we believe it is sensible because the prices will tend to move together very closely.
Gold is traded in an active and thick commodity market, and so is subject to strong
arbitrage forces. The active commodity market and the very low storage cost of gold would
make arbitrage comparatively easy if traders saw any signs of systematic ine±ciency. One
would thus expect the price of gold to be described quite closely as following a martingale.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests using our weekly gold price series for 1977{1997 indicate
that a unit root indeed cannot be rejected.5 Figure 3 shows the price of gold over our
sample period (in constant 1997 dollars). Descriptive statistics for gold prices over our
sample period are shown in table 1.
To analyze the e®ect of gold prices on a gold mining ¯rm's stock market value one
would want to control for market-wide stock price movements, because those movements
may represent, among other things, interest-rate changes or expected changes that would
a®ect gold mine stock prices directly.6 Thus, we begin with the standard CAPM market
model of equity returns:
Rit = Rft+¯i(Rmt ¡ Rft)+² [15]
where R i st h er a t eo fr e t u r n ,t h eisubscript refers to the observed ¯rm, the m subscript
refers to the market, and the f subscript refers to the riskfree rate of return. We multiply
both sides of [15] by the stock value of the ¯rm at t¡1t og e tt h ee q u a t i o ni nt e r m so ft h e
supplies was indeed news to the market), the price of gold fell about $2/oz.
5 The test statistic is -2.11 and the 95% critical value is -3.12. This is consistent with the ﬂndings of
Pindyck, 1993. Selvanathan, 1991, found that a random walk hypothesis performed better than a
panel of gold price forecasters.
6 Over our sample period, the correlation between the return on the market index and the return on
gold futures is about 0.1, which is signiﬂcantly diﬁerent from 0 at the 1% level.
11change in ¯rm value:7
RitSit¡1 =¢ S it = RftSit¡1 + ¯i(Rmt ¡ Rft)Sit¡1 + ²Sit¡1; [16]
where ¢ indicates the di®erence between the period t and period t¡1 value of the variable.
We then specify explicitly the e®ect of the price of gold, which would otherwise be included
in the error term.
Recall that we are interested in the curvature of the relationship between S and pg.
This might be measured by the second derivative of a levels equation. Since our equation is
in di®erences, we include the di®erence/derivative of a quadratic relationship between stock
value and the price of gold. That is, if S = °0 +°1pg +°2p2
g,t h e nd S=° 1d p g+2° 2p gdp g.
So, we estimate the equation
¢Sit ¡ RftSit¡1 = ®1¢pgt +®2pgt¡1¢pgt +®3Sit¡1(
It
It¡1
¡ 1 ¡ Rft)+S it¡1²; [17]
where S is the stock market value of the ¯rm, pg is the price of gold, I is a value-weighted
stock market index,8 and ®'s are parameters. In this model, ®3 i st h ee s t i m a t eo ft h e
CAPM ¯.9 The coe±cient ®2 indicates the convexity (if ®2 > 0) or concavity (if ®2 < 0)
of the relationship between the price of gold and the value of the ¯rm.
We examine the stock market values of 17 gold mining companies that are traded in
the U.S or Canada. We arrived at this dataset by examining lists of U.S. and Canadian
gold producers and including each ¯rm that (a) produced at least 10,000 ounces of gold
in 1996, (b) mined gold predominantly or exclusively in the U.S., Canada, and Australia,
(c) was primarily in the gold mining business, and (d) was publicly traded and is covered
7 We focus on just the equity value of the ﬂrm. In section IV, we discuss debt as a (omitted) cost that
the ﬂrm faces.
8 Using an equally-weighted index instead does not aﬁect the results.
9 Note that the equation does not include a constant term. We also estimated the equation with
a constant term and found practically identical results. Similarly, since theory dictates that the
coe–cient on RftSit¡1 is 1, we subtract this term from both sides of [16]. Including this term on the
righthand side and estimating an unrestricted coe–cient makes virtually no diﬁerence in the results,
though it does yield very noisy estimates on the riskfree rate term.
12by the CRSP stock market data. This produced 21 ¯rms. We then eliminated 4 ¯rms for
which fewer than 104 weekly stock observations (2 years of observations) were available.
For all 17 ¯rms used in the analysis, estimation of [17] with just a linear gold price term
indicated that the value of the ¯rm has a positive and statistically signi¯cant relationship
to the price of gold.
The full sample period we use is weekly observations for January 1977 through De-
cember 1997, a total of 1095 weeks. Not all ¯rms are in the sample for this full period.
Some ¯rms came into existence after 1977. Also, some ¯rms have recently diversi¯ed and
gold mining has become a relatively small share of their operations. We therefore drop
recent years of operations for these ¯rms.
The stock market values are taken from CRSP data. Since they can lead to large
valuation changes, we drop all weeks in which the stock goes ex-dividend or the number
of shares outstanding changes.10 We use the nearest-contract gold futures price (traded
on the COMEX division of the New York Mercantile Exchange; price data obtained from
Tick Data Inc.) to represent the price of gold. While that contract changes every other
month, the gold price change that we use is always the change for a given contract, not a
comparison of prices on two di®erent contracts.
For the riskfree rate, we use the one-year T-bill yield on the day of observation trans-
formed to a weekly interest rate. For each company we use weekly observations (closing
price on the last trading day of each week) to estimate the value of the ¯rm as a function
of the price of gold.
Since the rent dissipation or fat e®ect that we hypothesize is a function of the real
wealth of the ¯rm, we need to de°ate all variables. We de°ate S, pg and I to 1997 dollars
using the consumer price index (all items { urban consumers). We translate the nominal
T-bill yield used for Rf to a real yield by Rr
f =
1+Rf
1+… ¡ 1, where ¼ is the in°ation rate
calculated from the CPI for the month of the observation.
10 The results are virtually the same when we include these weeks and add back in the value of dividends
paid.
13The error term in the regression we estimate will be heteroskedastic, both because
the equation is in terms of the value of the ¯rm (as indicated in [16]) which changes over
time, and because exogenous factors a®ect the volatility of stock market returns. We
address this problem in two di®erent ways. First, we estimate [17] by OLS, but we report
White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Second, we estimate by GLS, explicitly
controlling for heteroskedasticity caused by the presence of St¡1 in the error term.11
A. Results from estimation of a Quadratic Value Function
We begin by estimating [17] for each of the 17 ¯rms in the sample. The sample periods
di®er across ¯rms, but each regression includes at least 166 observations. The results
of these regressions are shown in table 2. These results support a concave relationship
between the price of gold and the aggregate values of many of the gold mining ¯rms. The
estimated second derivative is negative for 12 of the 17 ¯rms, signi¯cantly negative (at
the 5% level) for 8 of these ¯rms. Of the 5 estimated positive second derivatives, 1 is
statistically signi¯cant. Calculating the z-statistic for the 17 estimated second derivatives
yields a test statistic of ¡42:38 with a standard error of
p
17 = 4:12, which is signi¯cant
at the 1% level.
The other parameters estimated are reasonable and consistent with expectations. The
implied ¯rst derivative of stock market value with respect to the price of gold is positive
for each ¯rms at the median price of gold in the sample and is positive for nearly all gold
p r i c ev a l u e st h a to c c u rw h i l et h e¯ r mi si nt h es a m p l e .T h eC A P M¯parameter estimated
for these ¯rms varies, but is statistically distinguishable from 1.0 in only three cases.
To interpret the magnitude of the curvature of the estimated value function, we create
a benchmark slope for each ¯rm in its lean state. We calculate the estimated slope of each
¯rm's value function when the price of gold is $411.00, its 25th percentile value in the
full 1095 week sample. We then calculate by how much the slope is estimated to change
11 We do this by dividing both sides of equation [17] by St¡1. We also tested for cointegration of
ﬂrm value and the (nearest contract) futures price of gold. In all cases, the null hypothesis of no
cointegration was strongly rejected (t-statistics above 15 in all cases compared to a critical value that
varies with number of observations, but is around 3).
14when the price of gold increases to $482.15, its median value over our entire sample period.
These ¯gures are given in the ¯rst columns of table 3.
Graphically, this is a comparison of the slope at point B to the slope at point A in
¯gure 2. In terms of our equation [11], this is S0(pH
g )=S0(pL
g ) ¡ 1. For Alta Gold, if the
4.6% decline in the slope were due solely to fat, this would suggest that when the price
of gold increases slightly starting from its median level, at least 4.6% of the incremental
gain is dissipated, i.e., is not re°ected in increased shareholder wealth. Recall that this is
a lower bound since the V function is (weakly) convex.
Using the separate estimates for the 17 ¯rms, one can construct an estimated change
in the value of the 17-¯rm portfolio as a function of pg. We calculate this by taking a
weighted average of the slopes of the value functions where the weights are the average
market capitalization of each ¯rm over the time period it is in the sample. We then again
c a l c u l a t eb yh o wm u c ht h es l o p eo fSis estimated to change for an increase in the price
of gold from its 25th percentile to the 50th percentile value, as a percentage of the slope
when the price of gold is at its 25th percentile. The result is an estimated decline of 12:3%
(of the slope at pg = 411:00), and is signi¯cant at the 5% level.12
If the concavity were due solely to fat, our estimates would also imply a lower bound
on the total fat that the ¯rm would accumulate when the price of gold increases as a
proportion of the theoretical increase in wealth, which in ¯gure 2 is ¢F divided by ¢V .
Even if the ¯rm is fat-free when the price of gold is at $411.00/oz., the aggregate estimate
for the 17 ¯rms implies that at least 6.1% of the total potential wealth gain when the price
increases to $482.45 is either not realized or not passed along to shareholders.
We have also estimated the quadratic relationship by GLS on the assumption that the
heteroskedaticity in the residuals is solely caused by the presence of Sit¡1 in the residual,
as shown in equation [17]. The resulting convexities/concavities for the ¯rms are shown
in column (2) of table 3. Although there are substantial di®erences for a few of the ¯rms
12 The variance of this estimate is calculated on the assumption that the estimates for each ﬂrm are
statistically independent.
15{ Echo Bay, Getchell, and Goldcorp { the general pattern is robust to this alternative
estimation approach. The remaining columns of table 3 we refer to in the next section in
the context of testing for alternative explanations for the concavity we have found.
B. Results from Estimation of a Piecewise-Linear Value Function
Estimation of the value function as quadratic in the price of gold is a natural starting
point since we are interested in the curvature of the relationship, but the quadratic is quite
restrictive. As an alternative and a sensitivity test, we also estimated the relationship
between the ¯rm value and the price of gold as a piecewise linear function, with breaks at
the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of pg during the sample used for each ¯rm.
F o rr e g r e s s i o n sw i t hl e s st h a nt h ee n t i r es a m p l e ,b r e a k sa tt h e2 5 t ha n d7 5 t hp e r c e n t i l e s
during the relevant sample period were used rather than the values shown in table 1.
To accommodate tests of slope di®erences, the regressions are run with a slope term in
e®ect over all prices (¢pgt), and additional slope terms that are relevant only for prices in,
respectively, the lowest (¢pL
gt)a n dh i g h e s t( ¢ p H
gt) quartiles of the gold price distribution.
The results, shown in table 4, are consistent with the quadratic estimation. For 9 of
the 17 ¯rms the slope in the lowest quartile of gold prices is estimated to be signi¯cantly
(at the 5% level) steeper than in the middle range of prices, indicating concavity. In no
case is the slope signi¯cantly °atter in the lowest quartile than in the middle range of
prices. For 5 of the 17 ¯rms the slope in the highest quartile of gold prices is estimated
to be signi¯cantly (at the 5% level) °atter than in the middle range of prices, indicating
concavity, while it is signi¯cantly steeper in the highest quartile for only one ¯rm. An
F-test of whether ¢pL
gt =¢ p H
gt indicates that the slope is signi¯cantly (at the 5% level)
smaller in the top quartile for 9 ¯rms (7 of which indicated signi¯cant concavity in the
quadratic function estimation), signi¯cantly greater in the top quartile for 1 ¯rm, and the
slope is not signi¯cantly di®erent between the quartiles for the remaining 7 ¯rms.
We calculated for each ¯rm the ratio of the estimated slope in the top quartile to the
estimated slope in the bottom quartile. The unweighted average of this statistic across the
17 ¯rms is estimated to be 0.64, implying that the average slope of S in the top quartile of
16the gold prices faced by the ¯rm is 36% smaller than in the bottom quartile. Thus, again
t h e r ei ss t r o n ge v i d e n c et h a tf o rm a n yo ft h e s e¯ r m st h es l o p eo ft h eSfunction is greater
when gold prices are low than when they are high.
IV. Alternative Explanations for the Concavity Result
We are tempted to interpret our ¯nding of signi¯cant concavity for a number of ¯rms
in our sample as showing that these ¯rms are not maximizing pro¯ts given the prices they
face, and in particular as con¯rming the idea that increases in wealth will be (expected
by Wall Street to be) dissipated in ine±ciency. There are, however, a number of potential
alternative explanations that we need to discuss.
A. Progressive Corporate Pro¯ts Tax
The progressive corporate pro¯ts tax in the U.S. | broadly, zero tax when the ¯rm
has negative earnings and a linear rate of 34%-48% (at di®erent times in our sample
period) when it has more than minimal positive earnings | might explain some concavity
in the S(pg) function, to the extent that this progressivity makes after-tax °ow pro¯ts a
concave function of pre-tax °ow pro¯ts. To consider an extreme possibility, suppose that
at low values of pg a marginal pre-tax dollar is untaxed, while at high levels it is taxed
immediately at rate t. Then taxes would cause the slope of a °ow-pro¯t function at high
g o l dp r i c e st ob eo n l y1¡ttimes what it would be absent taxes, while there is no e®ect
at low gold prices.
This calculation is misleading, however, because ¯rms can carry forward losses to
o®set pro¯ts. To see that e®ect operating starkly, consider another extreme possibility:
suppose that (1) positive pro¯ts are taxed at 48% each year and negative pro¯ts have no
tax liability, (2) losses always can be carried forward long enough to o®set future pro¯ts,
and (3) the discount rate is zero. In that case, all ¯rms would pay 48% on their net (over
time) pro¯ts. Any change in wealth from a change in the price of gold would be taxed at
48% regardless of the level of gold prices. In that extreme case, the corporate pro¯ts tax
would not a®ect the convexity or concavity of S.
17In fact, neither of these extreme possibilities is accurate: the tax code is much more
complex. In particular, tax losses can be carried forward only for a limited amount of
time, and they lose value when they are carried forward, because of (time) discounting.
Tax losses can also be carried backward. In addition, investment tax credits, opportunities
for arbitrage (as when a ¯rm with tax losses and a ¯rm with tax pro¯ts merge), and
international tax treaties greatly complicate the analysis. Still, the ability to smooth
taxable income across years means that the marginal tax rate that a ¯rm faces is likely
to vary much less than would be suggested by a simple view of the corporate pro¯t tax
schedule.13
However, these arguments about the e®ect of taxes on accounting after-tax pro¯ts as
a function of accounting pre-tax pro¯ts are not exactly on point for our analysis, because
we are examining the stock market value of these ¯rms, S(pg), not the year-by-year pro¯ts.
When the implications of this are examined carefully, it turns out that the piecewise-linear
tax rate is more likely to have a convexifying than a concavifying e®ect on S.
To see why, start by noting that all of the ¯rms we study have positive stock market
values. A positive stock market value implies that the present value of expected after-tax
pro¯ts of the ¯rm is positive. This immediately implies that the present value of expected
before-tax pro¯ts of the ¯rm is also positive.
Next, recognize that in the presence of the two-rate tax system described (no tax on
negative earnings and a constant tax rate t on positive earnings), a ¯rm with positive
present value of future before-tax earnings faces a present value of tax liability that is at
least a proportion t of the present value of its future before-tax earnings. The proportion
will be exactly t if either the ¯rm never makes a loss in any tax period or the ¯rm can
fully o®set losses against earlier or later pro¯ts (which requires, among other things, no
13 Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) examine the eﬁect of asymmetries in the tax schedule on the marginal
tax rate that corporations in fact face. They study all non-ﬂnancial corporations, not speciﬂcally
gold mining companies. They account for investment tax credits and credits for foreign income as
well as a number of other complexities of the tax code. They ﬂnd that at a time when the marginal
corporate tax rate varied between zero and 46% according to the tax schedule, the eﬁective expected
marginal tax varied cross-sectionally from 18.9% to 38.6% depending on the tax position of the ﬂrm.
18discounting). But if the ¯rm ever makes losses and those losses cannot fully o®set pro¯ts
then the \present value average tax rate" | the present value of its tax liability divided
by the present value of its future earnings | will be greater than t.14
Thus, for a ¯rm with positive expected present value of earnings, the present value
average tax rate is higher when the ¯rm is more likely to have negative earnings years.
The likelihood of negative earnings is almost certainly correlated with low gold prices, so
the present value average tax rate is most likely to decline as gold prices rise. The S
function is the residual after-tax value so if the corporate income tax were the only cause
for non-linearity of S,t h e nSwould probably have greater slope when pg is high than
when pg is low.
Empirically, it is worth noting columns (5) and (6) of table 3, which show results
when the sample period is broken into 77-86 and 87-97, around the 1986 tax law changes
in the U.S. These changes for the most part made it more di±cult to carry losses forward
and backward, making the e®ective marginal tax rate in any one year more responsive to
earnings in the year. We ¯nd concavity of S f u n c t i o n si nb o t hp e r i o d s .
B. Omission of Relevant Correlated Prices
As explained in section II, if a price were non-linearly related to the price of gold
we examine and if that omitted price were important in the pro¯t functions of the ¯rms
observed, a concave relationship between ¯rm stock market value and the price of gold
we examine could be falsely inferred. To be concrete, the most likely culprit if this were
an important issue would be the omission of future gold prices from our regression. For
instance, if the ten-year-out futures price of gold were concave in the gold price we include
in the regression, our reported results could obtain even in the absence of a true concave
relationship.
14 To illustrate the logic, assume that losses cannot be carried forward or back, the discount rate is
zero, and the tax rate is 0.5. Then a ﬂrm that loses 20 one year and earns 100 the next will have a
present value of future earnings of 80 and a present value of future tax liability of 50. This implies a
present value average tax rate of 0.625.
19Unfortunately, futures prices for gold have not generally existed for delivery more than
two years in the future during our sample period. The longest contract for which prices are
available throughout our time frame is the one for which delivery is due 12-14 months in
the future (the 7th nearest contract). Still, if the futures price curve tends to be concave,
one would still expect to see some indication of this in a contract that constitutes a claim
more than a year in the future.
The simplest approach to testing this explanation would be to include both this longer
futures price and the nearer futures price in the regression. These prices, however, are so
highly correlated that doing so increases the standard errors of the estimates to the extent
that the estimated second derivatives could not be statistically distinguished from zero or
from the estimates that we had obtained without the long futures price.15
An alternative approach, however, produces results that are at odds with this expla-
nation of the concavity. If long future prices are concave in nearby future prices, then
it follows that nearby future prices are convex in long future prices.16 Thus, omitting
the nearby future gold price and using only the longer future gold price would be omit-
ting a price that is convex in the included price and would lead to an overstatement of
the convexity of the stock price function. We did this using the 12-14 month out futures
price. The slope changes implied by these estimates and their standard errors are shown
in column (3) of table 3. It is apparent that this substitution makes very little di®erence
in the results, though it might be causing all estimates of second derivatives to be closer
to zero. The estimated concavity of the aggregate portfolio implies that an increase in
price from the 25th percentile to the median price of gold during our sample period would
decrease the slope of the aggregate S function by 10.7%, which is smaller than the 12.3%
we estimated when using the nearest futures price, but the di®erence is much smaller than
15 As stated earlier, we have carried out augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on the 1977-97 gold price se-
ries, which indicate the behavior of gold prices cannot statistically be distinguished from a random
walk. Of course, longer-term mean-reverting behavior is very di–cult to diagnose and, perhaps
more importantly, investor beliefs with regard to patterns of mean reversion present an even greater
challenge.
16 Note that we are discussing here the actual relationship between these prices, not an estimated
statistical relationship, for which this statement might not hold.
20the one standard error of either estimate. Using a futures price that is nearly a year fur-
ther in the future and omitting the next-to-nearest contract price does not tend to make
the estimated S functions any more convex. Thus, the evidence lends no support to this
explanation for the concave S functions we ¯nd.
Finally, with the nearby and longer term futures price series, we can test directly for
a non-linear relationship between these prices. A linear regression of the 12-14 month out
futures price on the nearest futures price and the square of the nearest futures price yields
an insigni¯cant parameter estimate on the second order term. Thus, neither of the tests
we have carried out indicates that the concavity we ¯nd is a result of nonlinearity in the
relationship between nearby and longer futures prices of gold.17
The other potentially important omitted output price is the price of silver. Most
gold producers also mine some silver since deposits are often co-located. Of the 17 ¯rms
in our sample, 7 exhibit a positive and statistically signi¯cant ¯rst-order e®ect of silver
prices on ¯rm value in a regression with the changes in the price of both gold and silver.
Column (4) of table 3 presents the estimated convexities/concavitites (in gold price) after
adding ¯rst- and second-order silver terms to the estimation of equation [17]. While the
estimated second-order e®ects of gold price changes change somewhat, the basic result that
the majority are concave in gold price remains. The S is still estimated to be a concave
function of the price of gold for 11 of the 17 ¯rms and for 4 of those the second derivative is
statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level. Also, the second order e®ect of silver is estimated
to be concave for most of the ¯rms: 13 of the 17 have estimated concave e®ects of the price
of gold and for 5 of those, the e®ect is statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level.18
17 Some readers have suggested that mean reversion in the price of gold might produce concavity in
S. First, it is important to note that systematic mean reversion would imply proﬂtable arbitrage
opportunities that are not pursued by traders. Second, the empirical evidence mentioned earlier
is that a random walk is consistent with gold price movements during our sample. Finally, mean
reversion is actually just a special case of the omitted price analysis, where the omitted prices are
the future prices of gold. For an omitted output price to explain the concavity we ﬂnd, it would have
to be concave in the included price. As discussed in the text, we ﬂnd no evidence to support this.
18 The most noticeable change in estimate is for Coeur D’Alene, which is the company the by far has
earned the largest share of its revenues from silver, in some years more than its revenue from gold.
Coeur D’Alene’s S function is estimated to be signiﬂcantly concave in the price of silver.
21A second category of omitted prices that could potentially be important is input prices.
If the industry faced increasing marginal costs of some input, then it seems conceivable
that this could transfer (rather than dissipate) the rents generated from high gold prices.
We do not believe this is likely to be very important for four reasons.
First, the industry executives we talked to did not think it plausibly important (al-
though they did suggest that geologists are better paid when gold prices are high).
Second, ¯rm-level increasing marginal cost does not have this e®ect: for instance, if
the marginal exploration project is much more expensive than the inframarginal projects,
it is still true that the ¯rm can continue to do at a higher pg what it was doing at a lower
pg, so the upper-envelope result still holds.
Third, and perhaps most important, although the industry-level supply curve of some
inputs (such as geologists) may be sharply upward-sloping in the short run, so that the
short-run e®ect of an increase in pg is to make even inframarginal exploration projects
substantially more costly, it is hard to believe that the long-run supply curve of geologists is
so steeply upward-sloping as it would need to be to explain our results. Because we examine
the e®ects of changes in pg on the stock-market estimate of the present value of pro¯ts,
e®ects that apply to current-year or near-term future pro¯ts but not to further-out pro¯ts
will have limited e®ect on our results. (This is particularly true in a competitive extractive
industry such as gold mining, where postponing production until a hypothetical large
input-price spike has passed would not permanently lose production or market position as
it might in some other industries.)
Finally, changes in the price of long-lived capital that the ¯rm owns, rather than rents,
would not explain observed concavity. If, for instance, increases in the price of gold raise
the value of land on which the gold mine is located, that will not lead to concavity of the S
function if the mining ¯rm owns the land. While such changes a®ect the opportunity cost
of mining, that is exactly o®set by the capital gain or loss that the ¯rm enjoys from owning
the land. Changes in the price of gold are part of the owner's option value of owning the
land and thus will convexify the value of the owning company. Another way to put this is
22that changes in the market value of an owned asset do not a®ect the basic argument that
the ¯rm could continue to use the same production plan | the argument that leads via
an upper-envelope e®ect to convexity of V .
C. Debt
One important category of cost that deserves special attention is the cost of debt.
In the regressions, debt was not considered part of the value of the ¯rm. In fact, debt
represents a cost to ¯rm owners that varies with the value of the ¯rm. As such, if it
varied in a convex fashion with the price of gold, it could conceivably concavify S.W e
argue, however, that it seems much more likely to convexify S than cause it to be concave.
For a given amount of outstanding debt, the cost to the ¯rm (to the equity-holders, that
is) to retire that debt varies with the net present value of the ¯rm's earnings (before
debt payments) in the way shown in ¯gure 4. If the ¯rm is relatively wealthy, then the
cost of the debt is una®ected by marginal changes in ¯rm wealth. If the ¯rm is in some
¯nancial di±culty, then payments will vary approximately linearly with ¯rm value, since
debt holders become the residual claimants. And if the ¯rm is worthless, then likewise the
debt payments won't occur. An intuition that debt may concavify the equity value of the
¯rm comes from thinking about ¯rms whose value varies along segments A and B, in which
case the cost of debt is convex in the ¯rm's performance and might lead to concavity of
the equity value.19 However, we would argue that it is more likely that ¯rms with ongoing
operations are either on segment B or segment C. In contrast to the A-B segments, the B-C
segments form a concave function representing the cost of debt as a function of ¯rm wealth.
In this region, the non-linearity of the debt payments tends to convexify the residual S
function because the debt payments are concave in the ¯rm value.20
19 Approaching this situation, however, would coincide with the ﬂrm having little equity value and
greater opportunity to take advantage of the option value that bankruptcy law provides.
20 Related to this discussion of debt is the possible eﬁect of imperfect capital markets. If ﬂrms had to
ﬂnance new exploration internally because external capital markets were unavailable, then increases
in the price of gold would create ﬂnancing for new investments, investments that would have pro-
gressively lower rates of return (though still greater than outside-the-ﬂrm investment options). This
could result in a concave value function. We mention this only as a footnote because these ﬂrms seem
to have unencumbered access to capital markets and in our interviews with managers we heard no
23D. Changing Variance in Gold Prices
In section II we noted that the concave relationship that we ¯nd between the current
price of gold and the stock market value of some ¯rms could possibly obtain if the real
option value of gold mining, which increases with the variance of gold prices, were a concave
function of pg. We showed above that this would require that the conditional variance of
prices be a strongly concave function of the price of gold.
We have attempted to address this concern by estimating the relationship between
the level and the expected future variance of gold prices. To do this, for every observation,
we calculated the variance of the next 26 weekly gold price observations (for the next-to-
nearest gold futures contract). We then regressed this measure of actual future variation in
gold price on a constant, the gold price level and its square, using 42 observations spaced
six months apart over the 21 year sample period. We found a positive and signi¯cant
relationship between the gold price and the actual future variance of price, but we found
no signi¯cant concavity or convexity in the relationship.
E. Hedging by Gold Mining Firms
Many, though not all, gold mining ¯rms take positions in the gold futures market in
order to hedge the risk associated with gold price movements.21 If a gold mining ¯rm sells
gold forward at a ¯xed price, this °attens out the ¯rm's S function; the value of the ¯rm
is less a®ected by changes in the price of gold (i.e., the ¯rm has already sold some gold,
and therefore owns less than otherwise).
Tufano (1996 and 1997) studies hedging by gold mining ¯rms.22 He ¯nds that hedging
mention of proﬂtable projects that were not being pursued due to capital constraints. See Blanchard,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) for evidence of the response of investment to cash windfalls.
They interpret their results as supporting an agency theory in which managers act to maximize their
length of tenure.
21 One of the executives we spoke with said that banks now often require or prefer this, when the gold
mining ﬂrm borrows from a bank.
22 Tufano (1997) also explores the relationship between gold prices and ﬂrm values, but does so in terms
of rate of return or percentage changes. He shows that the rate of return on a mining stock would
be less sensitive to the rate of return on gold when the price of gold is high than when it is low, if
24varies substantially across ¯rms. He describes two types of ¯nancial hedging that are
common in the industry: linear strategies, such as selling gold forward, which reduce the
overall exposure of the ¯rm's value to changes in gold prices, and non-linear strategies,
such as buying put options, which act as insurance, protecting the ¯rm's value only if the
price of gold falls below a certain level. Of course, linear strategies generically should have
no e®ect on the concavity or convexity of S. The non-linear insurance strategies used in
the industry, such as buying put options, should have a convexifying e®ect on S.23
These generic conclusions could possibly be misleading, however, if in the time period
we examine ¯rms happen to have systematically engaged in more risk management when
g o l dp r i c e sw e r eh i g ht h a nw h e nt h e yw e r el o w .S u c hb e h a v i o rc o u l dl e a dt oaf o r t u i t o u s l y
°atter S function at high gold prices than at low gold prices, that is, concavity of S.
Unfortunately, Tufano's data are for only a relatively short time span and one in which
risk management practices were changing in the industry. Thus, it is di±cult to infer from
his results whether a systematic relationship between the level of risk management and
the price of gold could explain the concavity that we ¯nd.24
As an empirical check on the possible e®ect of hedging on the concavity of S,w e
examined ¯rms that engage in little or no hedging. Peter Tufano has provided us a list
of ¯rms that engaged in no hedging activities in 1990 or 1992. We assumed that if a ¯rm
showed up as engaged in no hedging in either of these years, then it was engaged in little
or no hedging in previous years.25 We then examined the two ¯rms on this list that were
the ﬂrm has no ￿exibility in its production plan. His equation (2) also conﬂrms that, in that case,
the value of the ﬂrm would be linear in the price of gold.
23 Whenever the ﬂrm acquires an option (whether to buy or to sell), its value function becomes more
convex; if it sold options to others, its value function would become more concave. The non-linear
strategies of gold mining ﬂrms fall almost entirely into the ﬂrst category.
24 Related to the issue of hedging is purchases and sales of mines which change a ﬂrm’s exposure to
gold prices. In fact, mines (or shares of mines) are frequently sold among ﬂrms. We have found no
evidence that the ﬂrms in our sample tend to sell mines when prices are high and buy them when
prices are low, which would be necessary to explain the concavity we ﬂnd. Furthermore, the fact that
the ﬂrms we observe, in aggregate, display concave value as a function of gold prices makes it even
less likely that the concavity could be explained in this way, to the extent that transfers are among
these ﬂrms.
25 Our discussions with industry participants suggest that hedging has tended to become more common
25also in our dataset for at least four years prior to 1992 | Coeur D'Alene and Homestake
Mining | and we used only data from prior to 1992.
For each of these ¯rms, the estimated stock value functions were very signi¯cantly
concave: the estimated second derivative terms were signi¯cant at the 5% level in both
cases. The proportional declines in the slopes of the ¯rms' value function when the price
of gold increases from $411.00 to $482.45 are estimated to be 9.2% and 6.1% respectively.
Thus, for both theoretical and empirical reasons, hedging practices are unlikely to explain
the concavity we ¯nd for some ¯rms.26
F. Optimal Labor/Executive Compensation Contracts
For incentive or risk-sharing reasons it might be optimal to give managers or workers
equity or options in the company. Giving them equity would of course not a®ect our
analysis,27 but giving them options would concavify the (remaining) value function of the
¯rm.
Similarly, if wages and salaries increase more than linearly with pg as part of an optimal
labor contract (explicit or implicit), this could account for concavity of the observed S
function, because an increasing share of wealth gains from gold price increases would be
distributed to workers, rather than shareholders. Indeed, it would do so in a way very like
the \fat" mechanism described above, although we might interpret it somewhat di®erently.
Given the magnitude of the concavity we ¯nd in a substantial fraction of our sample,
it seems very unlikely that executive compensation tied to earnings could account for
more than a trivial fraction of the explanation. Gold mining companies pay a very small
over time.
26 Even today, ﬂrms seldom hedge more than the equivalent of a few years of their production, so most
of their expected future production at any time remains unhedged, especially in light of the \replace
your output" rule of thumb discussed below.
27 This assumes that they do not hold many more shares when the price of gold is higher in the sample;
since equity holdings by managers have generally been increasing over time while gold prices have
been decreasing, this seems a plausible assumption.
26fraction of ¯rm value as executive compensation.28 One would expect this to be the
case for natural resource extraction companies because a comparatively large share of ¯rm
value is represented by tangible, transferable assets. That is, much of the ¯rm value is due
to its holdings of land or rights to mine, not value creation by the operations of the ¯rm.
Furthermore, in the case of gold mining, ¯rm value changes are largely due to events (in this
case, gold price shocks) that are completely exogenous to the ¯rm. Although we are unable
to make a quantitative comparison, we suspect that this was more true of gold mining
than of most industries during and around the sample period. Incentive/compensation
theory would then suggest that optimal compensation plans should not award managers a
signi¯cant share of ¯rm value changes that result from exogenous events.29
Mining labor costs are a much larger share of ¯rm operating costs than managerial
compensation. We discuss this in the following section.
G. Environmental Liabilities
A further potential non-fat explanation of concavity would be that gold mining ¯rms,
which are viewed as causing extensive environmental damage, might be required to pay
disproportionately more for \clean-up" if they are relatively rich. We believe that this
is unlikely to explain the concavity we observe. First, according to our industry and
government sources, most environmental legislation bearing on mining companies applies to
all mining, not to speci¯c sectors such as gold mining. Second, the reaction we elicited from
government regulators when we mentioned this hypothesis was that is was an interesting
idea, but that they were aware of no examples of such behavior. Third, although the
environmental liabilities are non-trivial | one source put them at about 15 percent of
28 For some of the largest ﬂrms in our sample | with market capitalizations from $1 billion to $4 billion
| CEO compensation including valuation of stock options, was less than $1 million per year in 1996.
29 Milgrom and Roberts (1992) call this the \informativeness principle." It is possible that despite the
(we believe greater than average) role of exogenous events in changes in ﬂrm value, shareholders might
want to give managers strong incentives to respond e–ciently to gold price movements by opening or
closing mines (and perhaps overcome the managers’ own tendencies towards risk aversion). In this
case, they might want to give some of the value change to managers. But, especially in view of how
simple it would be to design a compensation scheme that neutralized at least a substantial part of
the role of gold price changes, it would seem surprising if managers were given a large share of the
value changes resulting from gold price shocks.
27\hard" costs | they seem not to be viewed in the industry as being very much subject to
discretion or variation. Finally, for environmental liabilities to explain any of the concavity
we ¯nd, they would have to not only increase with the price of gold, but would have to
be convex in the price of gold, i.e., the proportion of marginal wealth required by new
liability would have to increase with the price of gold.
While the foregoing discussion may apply more to \ordinary course of business" li-
abilities, we also note that \asbestos-style" liabilities, which with some probability will
bankrupt the ¯rm, would also not make for concavity, but would simply reduce the value
of the ¯rm by some probability largely independent of (or at least not particularly convex
in) the price of gold.
H. Royalty Payments
Sometimes governments (or owners of auriferous properties who delegate the mining)
require payment of royalties for gold extraction. A linear royalty schedule (whether on
units, revenues, or pro¯ts), like a linear tax schedule, would not a®ect the predictions of
convexity. However, royalty rates that increase with the price of gold (or with the total
revenues attributable to a mine, for instance) could potentially cause concavity of the value
function. Accordingly, we asked our industry and government contacts to comment on this
possibility. It appears from our discussions that royalties are most often linear. There are
some royalties that kick in above a certain point, and others that are capped; thus some
w o u l dc o n t r i b u t et oc o n c a v i t ya n do t h e r st e n dt o w a r d sc o n v e x i t y .S o m e( \ N P I " )r o y a l t i e s
are based on accounting net pro¯ts, but one well-informed commentator suggested that it
is viewed as unwise for an agent who can extract royalty payments to take a percentage
of the net, because doing so stimulates cost accountants' creativity in undesirable ways,
somewhat as it is said to do in the case of Hollywood movies.
It is also notable that the hypothetical examples this source used in discussing the
matter with us had royalty rates of 1 percent or a few percent, except for one that was ten
percent of accounting pro¯ts. Although this is merely suggestive at this point, we think
it is some evidence that royalties as a whole are unlikely to be driving our results. Other
28industry sources also tended to come up with examples involving a few percentage points.
Thus, although our contacts suggested that large-percentage royalties might happen, in-
formed informal opinion did not seem consistent with this being a major explanation of
our results.
Finally, we also learned of Centurion, a company that specializes in exploration and
royalty collection: it sells properties on which gold deposits have been found to mining
companies and collects royalties. If it imposed more-than-linear royalties, one would expect
its S(¢) function to be correspondingly convex. In fact, our estimated S function for
Centurion was concave (although not statistically signi¯cantly concave).30
V. Where's the Fat?
We believe that the results above strongly suggest two things. First, there is some
kind of fat in at least a substantial fraction of the companies we study. Second, ¯rms may
well vary considerably in the extent to which they are subject to such fat.
We wish to be particularly cautious, however, about this second possible inference,
which is not proved, but only suggested, by our results. While we ¯nd statistically and
economically signi¯cant variations in the curvature of di®erent ¯rms' S functions, since we
do not observe V we cannot con¯dently infer anything about variations in the fat functions.
In fact, we would expect that the curvatures of the V function would di®er markedly across
¯rms. Consider two ¯rms, one of which owns a single mine with extraction costs of $50
per ounce for all gold in the mine and the other of which owns a larger portfolio of mines
with an array of extraction costs from $10 to $1000 per ounce. The former ¯rm would
have a virtually linear S function, while the latter's would be quite convex.
Nonetheless, a natural response to our ¯ndings is to ask wherein this fat consists, and
what determines how much of it there is. This has been a main focus of our interviews with
30 Centurion may have been in ﬂnancial distress during this period; however, we believe that should if
anything bias results towards ﬂnding its value function to be convex (through the usual bankruptcy-
option eﬁect).
29industry executives. Below, we discuss two places we have looked for fat and for factors
a®ecting the extent of fat.
A. Exploration Costs.
All the managers we spoke with seemed to believe that | either as an obviously sound
business policy, or because of pressure from stock-market analysts | it is imperative for
a gold-mining ¯rm to \replace" its extraction, either by exploration for new reserves or
by acquisition of existing mines (or of their owners). Several suggested that when gold
prices are high, ¯rms found themselves \having to", or perhaps \able to", engage in quite
unpromising exploration projects.
Because it is much harder to verify whether an exploration decision is value-increasing
than it is to verify whether a mine is being well managed, it seems a likely locus for
potentially value-reducing expenditures. In this connection, when we tested for and found
concavity of S and then looked for sources of fat in the oil industry (Borenstein and
Farrell, 1996), we were told by oil industry commentators that the industry dissipated a
great deal of the value increase during the early 1980s by \excessive" (at least ex post)
exploration. Clearly, a price increase should induce some increase in exploration activity,
but it is suggested that the oil industry's response was excessive.31
In the gold mining industry, the apparent rule of thumb that ¯rms believe they must
replace extraction also suggests a possible simple principal-agent theory for value dissipa-
tion after gold price increases. Suppose that mine managers have incentives to increase
output when pg rises, in a way that takes account of increased extraction costs but does
not take account of the marginal cost of ¯nding more gold. (This might plausibly happen
if mines are run as pro¯t centers.) Then it could easily be that their output-increasing
decisions, while optimal if the ¯rm optimized overall, would reduce the ¯rm's value condi-
tional on the ¯rm following the rule of thumb that it must replace all extraction. Another
possible theory would be that some ¯rms try to resist this rule of thumb and are penalized
31 See also Jensen (1986) for evidence of value-reducing exploration in the oil industry.
30by stock-market analysts who are trained to look for growth or at least sustainability of
revenue °ows. Several executives told us that they believe analysts behave in this way.
B. Non-Optimal Labor Compensation.
As mentioned earlier, if labor takes an increasing fraction of ¯rm wealth as the latter
grows, it could account for concavity of the net (i.e., stock market) value function. To
the extent that this goes beyond an optimal ex ante contract and becomes an ine±cient
ex post holdup or asset-stripping, one might characterize it as a form of fat. Though it is
sometimes di±cult to distinguish e±cient from ine±cient variations in labor compensation,
it is di±cult to see how it would be e±cient to reward miners for changes in ¯rm value
driven by exogenous changes in the price of gold. Empirically, while such labor rent-sharing
h a sb e e nd o c u m e n t e di ns o m ei n d u s t r i e s , 32 our discussions with industry participants
suggested that it is not likely to be much of an issue in gold mining. None reported that
wages moved noticeably with the price of gold.
VI. Conclusion
Once one is willing to consider the idea that there could be ine±ciency in ¯rms, it
might be natural to suspect that ¯rms will engage in more waste as corporate wealth
grows. We have examined this theory empirically in the gold mining industry. We found
that many gold mining ¯rms' stock-market values do not increase as much in response to
gold price increases when the price of gold is already high as when it is lower. This empirical
result contradicts the theoretical convexity result that stems from the upper-envelope, or
real option, e®ect.
The concavity result is particularly striking in the gold mining industry, as real options
play a major role in business decision making in gold mining. Firms make substantial
changes in their scope of operations and level of production in response to changes in the
price of gold. Such °exibility in production plans would seem (following standard theory)
to suggest strong convexity in the value of the ¯rm as a function of the price of gold.
32 See, for instance, Rose (1987).
31We posit that much of the observed concavity results from investors' beliefs that
(some) ¯rms will dissipate a share of wealth gains and that this share will be larger when
the ¯rm is wealthy than when it is under greater ¯nancial pressure. We also discuss a
number of alternative explanations for the concavity results and conclude that (1) the
progressive corporate pro¯t tax seems more likely to create convexity than concavity in
the stock market value functions, (2) ordinary mean reversion in gold prices would not yield
concavity; a particular form of stochastic evolution in gold prices could explain concavity,
but we ¯nd no evidence of this pattern, (3) observed forms of hedging by gold ¯rms are
likely to increase, not decrease, the convexity of ¯rm value as a function of the price of
gold, (4) optimal (or observed) executive compensation contracts are unlikely to explain
more than a tiny fraction of the concavity, (5) environmental liability is not likely to be a
substantial part of the explanation, and (6) royalties are unlikely to explain more than a
small fraction of the concavity.
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33Appendix: List of Industry Contacts
In addition to the academics listed in the title footnote, we are very grateful to the
following government and industry contacts who have kindly supplied information.
Earl Amey, U.S. Geological Survey
Paul Bateman { VP of Gold Institute
Margo Bergeson { Alta Gold
Pierre-Paul Bleau { Cambior
Mike Brown { Amax Gold
Ronald Cambre { Newmont Mining
Jerry Cooper { Asarco
Steve Dawson{ Campbell Resources
Larry Drew { Environmental manager for Hecla
Jane Engert { Mining industry specialist at the U.S. EPA
Tom Ferrell { Environmental coordinator for Sante Fe Mesquite Mine, owned by Newmont.
Robert Gilmore { Dakota Mining
Shannon Hill { Placer Dome
Denise Jones { Director of California Mining Association
Robbin Lee { Echo Bay
John Lutley { President of Gold Institute
G r e gP e l k a{C a l i f o r n i aS t a t eL a n d s
Michael Steeves { Homestake Mining
Les Van Dyke { Battle Mountain Gold
Dennis Wheeler { Coeur D'Alene
Richard Young { Barrick Gold
Les Youngs { California O±ce of Mine Reclamation
34Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Gold Price, 1977-1997
(Constant 1997 Dollars)
Percentiles
Mean: 543.37 10th: 385.45
Std Dev: 197.87 25th: 411.00
Min: 283.26 50th: 482.15
Max: 1695.18 75th: 612.76
90th: 746.40
35Table 2: Results from Quadratic Value Function Regresssions
COMPANY ¢pgt pgt¡1¢pgt CAPM ¯R 2 Obs Period
Alta¡ 293. -0.15 0.74 0.315 1033 77-97
( 35.) ( 0.03) ( 0.18)
Amax 1912. 5.60 0.79 0.429 511 87-97
( 1948.) ( 4.20) ( 0.27)
Barrick¡ 35510. -51.19 1.00 0.311 282 87-94
( 10168.) ( 17.01) ( 0.20)
Campbell¡ 243. -0.16 1.03 0.147 1040 77-97
( 27.) ( 0.02) ( 0.15)
Canyon¡ 1205. -1.99 0.70 0.177 566 86-97
( 133.) ( 0.23) ( 0.26)
Coeur D'Alene¡ 1171. -0.99 0.95 0.329 407 82-90
( 290.) ( 0.48) ( 0.16)
Dakota -167. 0.75 1.03 0.078 396 90-97
( 410.) ( 1.00) ( 0.50)
Echo Bay 5749. -1.61 1.04 0.320 694 83-97
( 3449.) ( 7.07) ( 0.17)
Getchell¡ 8470. -16.45 1.02 0.132 476 88-97
( 2020.) ( 4.19) ( 0.36)
Glamis 619. 0.96 0.30 0.301 232 93-97
( 1374.) ( 3.35) ( 0.20)
Goldcorp¡ 1542. -2.23 0.46 0.089 545 87-97
( 407.) ( 0.73) ( 0.24)
Homestake¡ 5639. -3.68 0.64 0.310 996 77-97
( 375.) ( 0.29) ( 0.12)
Meridian+ 212. 5.62 1.02 0.393 538 87-97
( 1146.) ( 2.51) ( 0.26)
Newmont 31329. -29.39 0.79 0.398 166 86-91
( 15289.) ( 28.44) ( 0.19)
Placer Dome 30152. -23.84 0.93 0.379 280 87-97
( 12631.) ( 27.02) ( 0.18)
Royal Oak 3539. -2.71 0.82 0.309 311 91-97
( 3443.) ( 8.45) ( 0.25)
Vista -105. 0.89 1.53 0.272 577 86-97
( 262.) ( 0.54) ( 0.38)
+ indicates statistically signiﬂcant convexity at the 5% level.
¡ indicates statistically signiﬂcant concavity at the 5% level.
White Heteroskedastic-Consistent Standard Errors in Parentheses.
36Table 3: Estimated Change in Slope of S Function when pg
increases from its 25th percentile ($411.00) to median ($482.45) price
COMPANY (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alta -4.6% 0.5% -3.5% -5.4% -4.3% -10.6%
(1 . 0 % ) (1 . 6 % ) (1 . 2 % ) (2 . 9 % ) (1 . 3 % ) (5 . 7 % )
Amax 9.5% 7.4% 8.4% 7.2% 9.5%
(7 . 1 % ) (4 . 8 % ) (6 . 1 % ) (8 . 3 % ) (7 . 1 % )
Barrick -25.2% -8.3% -21.1% -29.7% -25.2%
( 8.4%)( 10.3%) ( 7.3%)( 11.7%) ( 8.4%)
Campbell -6.6% -6.2% -5.4% -6.7% -6.0% -17.7%
(0 . 8 % ) (1 . 2 % ) (0 . 7 % ) (1 . 5 % ) (1 . 3 % ) (6 . 4 % )
Canyon -36.5% -32.6% -30.1% -42.2% -35.1%
(4 . 3 % ) (7 . 9 % ) (3 . 5 % ) (5 . 4 % ) (4 . 0 % )
Coeur D'Alene -9.2% -9.2% -8.9% 51.1% -10.6% 41.6%
( 4.5%) ( 3.8%) ( 3.2%)( 40.2%) ( 4.3%)( 21.3%)
Dakota 37.7% 25.1% 37.4% 23.6% 37.7%
( 50.1%)( 24.2%)( 52.7%)( 42.5%) ( 50.1%)
Echo Bay -2.2% -24.7% -4.1% 29.8% 18.1% 10.6%
( 9.9%) ( 3.3%) ( 8.0%)( 26.7%) ( 8.0%) ( 9.8%)
Getchell -68.4% -0.7% -49.6% -73.9% -68.4%
( 17.4%)( 34.0%)( 12.6%)( 18.8%) ( 17.4%)
Glamis 6.7% 3.6% 20.2% 5.8% 6.7%
( 23.6%)( 17.5%)( 24.7%)( 25.7%) ( 23.6%)
Goldcorp -25.4% 17.1% -19.4% -41.4% -25.4%
( 8.3%)( 10.4%) ( 6.5%)( 13.7%) ( 8.3%)
Homestake -6.3% -5.8% -5.4% -6.0% -5.7% -11.9%
(0 . 5 % ) (0 . 5 % ) (0 . 5 % ) (0 . 8 % ) (0 . 5 % ) (4 . 6 % )
Meridian 15.9% 11.9% 13.3% 20.7% 15.9%
( 7.1%) ( 6.1%) ( 6.0%)( 11.1%) ( 7.1%)
Newmont -10.9% -7.7% -8.8% -8.0% -8.4%
( 10.5%)( 13.9%)( 10.0%)( 16.2%) ( 8.9%)
Placer Dome -8.3% -2.4% -7.8% 0.4% -8.3%
( 9.4%) ( 5.7%) ( 8.0%)( 12.9%) ( 9.4%)
Royal Oak -7.9% -8.0% -19.8% -29.7% -7.9%
( 24.8%)( 27.2%)( 21.0%)( 38.0%) ( 24.8%)
Vista 24.3% 15.2% 25.9% 18.4% 32.1%
( 14.9%)( 13.2%)( 13.5%)( 23.7%) ( 15.0%)
(1) OLS with White standard errors (from table 2)
(2) GLS with correction for heteroskedasticity caused by Sit¡1 in residual
(3) same as (1) except using 7th nearest gold futures price instead of nearest gold futures price
(4) same as (1) except including linear and quadratic terms for nearest silver futures price
(5) same as (1) except including only observations during 1977-1986
(6) same as (1) except including only observations during 1987-1997
37Table 4: Results from Piecewise Linear Regresssions
COMPANY ¢pL
gt ¢pgt ¢pH
gt CAPM ¯R 2 Obs
Alta¡ 222. 157. -47. 0.79 0.285 1033
( 65.) ( 19.) ( 35.) ( 0.19)
Amax -211. 4478. 421. 0.78 0.425 511
( 698.) ( 485.) ( 708.) ( 0.27)
Barrick¡ 18617. 9914. -6213. 0.95 0.335 282
( 6944.) ( 2708.) ( 2824.) ( 0.21)
Campbell¡ 530. 130. -93. 1.10 0.158 1040
( 108.) ( 23.) ( 27.) ( 0.16)
Canyon¡ 449. 248. -232. 0.70 0.182 566
( 107.) ( 47.) ( 48.) ( 0.26)
Coeur D'Alene -39. 558. 18. 0.92 0.320 407
( 151.) ( 53.) ( 150.) ( 0.17)
Dakota -73. 170. -7. 0.96 0.076 396
( 82.) ( 48.) ( 74.) ( 0.52)
Echo Bay¡ 2823. 5085. -760. 1.04 0.328 694
( 1272.) ( 474.) ( 945.) ( 0.17)
Getchell¡ 3838. 569. -44. 1.11 0.164 476
( 1133.) ( 192.) ( 210.) ( 0.35)
Glamis -113. 1037. -23. 0.30 0.302 232
( 324.) ( 170.) ( 217.) ( 0.20)
Goldcorp¡ 1091. 324. -56. 0.48 0.109 545
( 375.) ( 71.) ( 85.) ( 0.24)
Homestake¡ 8912. 3749. -2820. 0.68 0.321 996
( 1368.) ( 355.) ( 423.) ( 0.12)
Meridian+ -117. 2516. 981. 1.02 0.392 538
( 461.) ( 271.) ( 448.) ( 0.26)
Newmont¡ 11889. 12576. 2374. 0.82 0.408 166
( 3824.) ( 2396.) ( 4138.) ( 0.19)
Placer Dome 551. 23473. -9369. 0.89 0.399 280
( 5063.) ( 2478.) ( 3554.) ( 0.18)
Royal Oak 710. 2239. 196. 0.84 0.312 311
( 770.) ( 395.) ( 489.) ( 0.25)
Vista 147. 282. 124. 1.52 0.269 577
( 128.) ( 53.) ( 99.) ( 0.39)
+ indicates statistically signiﬂcant convexity (at 5% level) when comparing slope in top and bottom quartile.
¡ indicates statistically signiﬂcant concavity (at 5% level) when comparing slope in top and bottom quartile.
White Heteroskedastic-Consistent Standard Errors in Parentheses.
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